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Quantum continuous variables [1] are being explored [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
as an alternative means to implement quantum key distribution, which is usually based on single
photon counting [15]. The former approach is potentially advantageous because it should enable
higher key distribution rates. Here we propose and experimentally demonstrate a quantum key
distribution protocol based on the transmission of gaussian-modulated coherent states (consisting of
laser pulses containing a few hundred photons) and shot-noise-limited homodyne detection; squeezed
or entangled beams are not required [13]. Complete secret key extraction is achieved using a reverse
reconciliation [14] technique followed by privacy amplification. The reverse reconciliation technique
is in principle secure for any value of the line transmission, against gaussian individual attacks based
on entanglement and quantum memories. Our table-top experiment yields a net key transmission
rate of about 1.7 megabits per second for a loss-free line, and 75 kilobits per second for a line with
losses of 3.1 dB. We anticipate that the scheme should remain effective for lines with higher losses,
particularly because the present limitations are essentially technical, so that significant margin for
improvement is available on both the hardware and software.
Much interest has arisen recently in using the elec-
tromagnetic field amplitudes to obtain possibly more
efficient quantum continuous variable (QCV) alterna-
tives [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] to
the usual photon-counting quan tum key distribution
(QKD) techniques (see ref. [15] and references therein)
— for instance, by using “non-classical” light beams
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. In fact, it was shown in
ref. [13] that squeezed or entangled light is not required
to achieve this goal: an equivalent level of security may
be obtained by transmitting “quasi-classical” coherent
states. When the line transmission is larger than 50 %
(line loss ≤ 3 dB), the physical limits on QCV cloning
[16, 17, 18] ensure that this protocol is secure against
individual attacks. This corroborates the fact that QKD
only requires non-orthogonal states, and may well work
with macroscopic signals instead of single photons [19].
There are in principle various way s for the partners Alice
and Bob to distribute keys beyond this 3 dB limit, for
instance by using entanglement purification [20] or post-
selection [12]. Therefore these QCV schemes stimulate
many fundamental questions about the physical origin of
QKD security. As will be shown below, cryptographic
security appears to have a strong relationship with en-
tanglement, even though our protocol does not rely on
entangled states.
Here we introduce and implement a coherent-state
QKD protocol, and we demonstrate that it is, in prin-
ciple, secure for any value of the line transmission. It
relies on the distribution of a gaussian key [7] obtained
by continuously modulating the phase and amplitude of
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coherent light pulses [13] at Alice’s side, and subsequently
performing homodyne detection at Bob’s side. The con-
tinuous data are then converted into a common binary
key via a specifically designed reconciliation algorithm
[8, 10]. The security against arbitrarily high losses is
achieved by reversing the reconciliation protocol, that is,
Alice attempts to guess what was received by Bob rather
than Bob guessing what was sent by Alice. Such a reverse
reconciliation protocol [14] gives Alice an advantage over
a potential eavesdropper Eve, regardless of the line loss.
The practical limitations of our scheme are essentially
technical, and appear to be due mostly to the limited
efficiency of the reconciliation software.
The protocol runs as follows [13]. First, Alice draws
two random numbers xA and pA from a gaussian dis-
tribution of mean zero and variance VAN0, where N0
denotes the shot-noise variance. Then, she sends the co-
herent state |xA + ipA〉 to Bob, who randomly chooses
to measure either quadrature x or p. Later, using a pub-
lic authenticated channel, he informs Alice about which
quadrature he measured, so she may discard the irrele-
vant data. After many similar exchanges, Alice and Bob
(and possibly the eavesdropper Eve) share a set of corre-
lated gaussian variables, which we call “key elements”.
Classical data processing is then necessary for Alice
and Bob to obtain a fully secret binary key. First, Al-
ice and Bob publicly compare a random sample of their
key elements to evaluate the error rate and transmission
efficiency of the quantum channel. From the observed
correlations, Alice and Bob evaluate the amount of infor-
mation they share (IAB = IBA) and the maximum infor-
mation Eve may have obtained (by eavesdropping) about
their values (IAE and IBE). It is known that Alice and
Bob can, in principle, distil from their data a common se-
cret key of size S > sup(IAB − IAE , IBA − IBE) bits per
2key element [21, 22]. This requires classical communica-
tion over an authenticated public channel, and may be
divided into two steps : reconciliation (that is, correcting
the errors while minimizing the information revealed to
Eve) and privacy amplification (that is, making the key
secret). As we deal here with continuous data, we devel-
oped a “sliced” reconciliation algorithm [8, 10] to extract
common bit strings from the correlated key elements. In
order to reconcile Bob’s measured data with Alice’s sent
data, the most natural way to proceed is that Bob gets
R extra bits of information from Alice in order to cor-
rect the transmission errors. The corresponding direct
reconciliation (DR) protocols, which have been used so
far in QCV QKD [7, 13], allow the generation of a com-
mon string of IAB + R bits, of which Eve may know up
to IAE + R bits. Here we rather consider reverse recon-
ciliation (RR) protocols [14], where Bob sends R bits of
information to Alice so that she incorporates the trans-
mission errors in her initial data. These RR protocols
allow the generation of a common string of IBA+R bits,
of which Eve may know IBE+R bits. This turns out to be
particularly well suited to QCV QKD, because it is more
difficult for Eve to control the errors at Bob’s side than
to read Alice’s modulation. The last step of key extrac-
tion, namely privacy amplification, consists of filtering
out Eve’s information by properly mixing the reconciled
bits to spread Eve’s uncertainty over the entire final key.
This procedure requires an estimate of Eve’s information
on the reconciled key, so we need a bound on IAE for
DR, or IBE for RR. In addition, Alice and Bob must
keep track of the information publicly revealed during
reconciliation. This knowledge is destroyed at the end
of the privacy amplification procedure, reducing the key
length by the same amount. The DR bound [13] on IAE
implies that the security cannot be warranted if the line
transmission G is below 50%. We will now establish the
RR bound on IBE , and show that it is not associated
with a minimum value of G.
In a RR scheme, Eve needs to guess Bob’s measure-
ment outcome without adding too much noise on his
data. This can be done via an “entangling cloner”, which
creates two quantum-correlated copies of Alice’s quan-
tum state, so Eve simply keeps one of them while sending
the other to Bob. Let (xin, pin) be the input field quadra-
tures of the entangling cloner, and (xB , pB), (xE , pE) the
quadratures of Bob’s and Eve’s output fields. To be safe,
we must assume Eve uses the best possible entangling
cloner compatible with the parameters of the Alice-Bob
channel: Eve’s cloner should minimize the conditional
variances [23, 24] V (xB |xE) and V (pB|pE), that is, the
variances of Eve’s estimates of Bob’s field quadratures
(xB , pB). These variances are constrained by Heisenberg-
type relations (see Appendix A), which limit what can be
obtained by Eve:
V (xB |xA)V (pB|pE) ≥ N
2
0
V (pB |pA)V (xB |xE) ≥ N
2
0
(1)
where V (xB |xA) and V (pB|pA) denote Alice’s condi-
tional variances. This means that Alice and Eve can-
not jointly know more about Bob’s conjugate quadra-
tures than is allowed by the uncertainty principle. Now,
Alice’s variances can be bounded by using the measured
parameters of the quantum channel, which in turn makes
it possible to bound Eve’s variances.
The channel is described by the linear relations xB =
G
1/2
x (xin + Bx) and pB = G
1/2
p (pin + Bp), with 〈x
2
in
〉 =
〈p2
in
〉 = V N0 ≥ N0, 〈B
2
x,p〉 = χx,pN0, and 〈xinBx〉 =
〈pinBp〉 = 0. Here χx, χp represent the channel noises re-
ferred to its input, called equivalent input noises [23, 24],
while Gx, Gp are the channel gains in x and p, and
V is the variance of Alice’s field quadratures in shot-
noise units (V = VA + 1). The output-output correla-
tions of the entangling cloner, described by V (xB |xE)
and V (pB|pE), depend only on the density matrix Din
of the input field (xin, pin), and not on the way it is pro-
duced, namely whether it is a gaussian mixture of coher-
ent states or one of two entangled beams. Inequalities (1)
thus have to be fulfilled for all physically allowed values
of V (xB |xA) and V (pB|pA), given Din. Therefore, the
values of V (xB |xA) and V (pB|pA) that should be used in
inequalities (1) to limit Eve’s knowledge are the minimum
values Alice might achieve by using the maximal entan-
glement compatible with V , namely (see Appendix A)
V (xB |xA)min = Gx(χx + V
−1)N0
V (pB|pA)min = Gp(χp + V
−1)N0 (2)
These lower bounds are thus directly connected with en-
tanglement, even though Alice does not use it in prac-
tice. They may be compared with the actual values
when Alice sends coherent states, that is, V (xB |xA)coh =
Gx(χx + 1)N0 and V (pB|pA)coh = Gp(χp + 1)N0. The
lower bounds on Eve’s conditional variances are then ob-
tained from equations (1) and (2), as:
V (pB|pE) ≥ N0/{Gx(χx + V
−1)}
V (xB |xE) ≥ N0/{Gp(χp + V
−1)} (3)
A physical realization of an entangling cloner reaching
these bounds is sketched in ref. [14].
To assess the security of the RR scheme, one assumes
that Eve’s ability to infer Bob’s measurement can reach
the limit put by inequalities (3). For simplicity, we con-
sider the channel gains and noises and the signal vari-
ances to be the same for x and p (in practice, deviations
should be estimated by statistical tests). The informa-
tion rates can be derived using Shannon’s theory for gaus-
sian additive-noise channels [25], giving
IBA = (1/2) log2[VB/(VB|A)coh]
= (1/2) log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (4a)
IBE = (1/2) log2[VB/(VB|E)min]
= (1/2) log2[G
2(V + χ)(V −1 + χ)] (4b)
expressed in bits per symbol (or per key element). Here
VB = 〈x
2
B〉 = 〈p
2
B〉 = G(V + χ)N0 is Bob’s vari-
ance, (VB|E)min = V (xB |xE)min = V (pB|pE)min =
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FIG. 1: Experimental set-up. Laser diode, SDL 5412
(780 nm); OI, optical isolator; λ/2, half-wave plate;
AOM, acousto-optic modulator; MF, polarization maintain-
ing single-mode fibre; OA, optical attenuator; EOM, electro-
optic amplitude modulator; PBS, polarizer; BS, beam split-
ter; PZT, piezoelectric transducer. Focal lengths (f ′) are
given in millimetres. R and T are reflection and transmis-
sion coefficients.
N0/{G(χ + V
−1)} is Eve’s minimum conditional vari-
ance, and (VB|A)coh = V (xB |xA)coh = V (pB|pA)coh =
G(χ+1)N0 is Alice’s conditional variance for a coherent-
state protocol. The secret bit rate of a RR protocol is
thus
∆IRR = IBA − IBE
= −(1/2) log2[G
2(1 + χ)(V −1 + χ)] (5)
and the security is guaranteed if ∆IRR > 0. The equiva-
lent input noise χ can be split into a “vacuum noise” com-
ponent due to the line losses, given by χvac = (1−G)/G,
and an “excess noise” component defined as ǫ = χ−χvac.
In the high-loss limit (G≪ 1), the RR protocol remains
secure if ǫ < (V −1)/(2V ) ≈ 1/2, that is, if the amount of
excess noise ǫ is not too large. In contrast, a DR protocol
requires low-loss lines, as the security is warranted only
if χ < 1, that is, if G > 1/(2−ǫ). Note that DR tolerates
an excess noise up to ǫ ≈ 1, so it might be preferred to
RR for low-loss but noisy channels.
Our experimental implementation (Fig. 1) of the quan-
tum key exchange uses 120-ns coherent pulses at a 800-
kHz repetition rate (wavelength of 780 nm, see Ap-
pendix A). Data bursts of 60,000 pulses have been anal-
ysed (Fig. 2). For each burst, a subset of the values are
disclosed to evaluate the transmission G and the total
added noise variance. The output noise has four contri-
butions: the shot noise N0, the channel noise χlineN0,
the electronics noise of Bob’s detector (Nel = 0.33N0),
and the noise due to imperfect homodyne detection effi-
ciency (Nhom = 0.27N0). When introducing line losses
using a variable attenuator, the measured χline increases
FIG. 2: Bob’s measured quadrature as a function of the am-
plitude sent by Alice (in Bob’s measurement basis) for a burst
of 60,000 pulses. The line transmission is 100% and the mod-
ulation variance is V = 41.7. The solid line represents the
expected unity slope. Inset, the corresponding histograms of
Alice’s (grey curve) and Bob’s (black curve) data.
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FIG. 3: Channel equivalent noise χline as a function of line
transmission G. The curve is the theoretical prediction χvac =
(1 − G)/G. The errors bars include two contributions with
approximately the same size, from statistics (evaluated over
blocks of 60,000 pulses) and systematics (calibration errors
and drifts).
as (1−G)/G, as shown in Fig. 3 (ǫline = 0 here). The two
detection noises Nel and Nhom originate from Bob’s de-
tection system, so they must be taken into account when
estimating IBA. In contrast, we may reasonably assume
that Eve cannot know or control the corresponding fluc-
tuations, so her attack is inferred on the basis of the
line noise χline only (see Appendix B for details). Fig-
ure 4 shows explicitly the mutual information between
all parties, which makes straightforward the comparison
between the DR and RR protocols.
We wrote a computer program that implements the
reconciliation algorithm followed by privacy amplification
(see Appendices A and B). Although Alice and Bob are
not spatially separated in the present set-up, the anal-
ysed data have the same structure as in a realistic cryp-
4V Gline Losses IBA IBE Irec Ideal RR rate Practical RR rate Ideal DR rate Practical DR rate
(dB) (bit) (% IBA) (% IBA) (kbit s
−1) (kbit s−1) (kbit s−1) (kbit s−1)
41.7 1 0 2.39 0 88 1,920 1,690 1,910 1,660
38.6 0.79 1.0 2.17 58 85 730 470 540 270
32.3 0.68 1.7 1.93 67 79 510 185 190 –
27 0.49 3.1 1.66 72 78 370 75 0 –
43.7 0.26 5.9 1.48 93 71 85 – 0 –
TABLE I: Ideal and practical net secret key rates. The parameters of the quantum key exchange are measured for several
values of the channel transmission G (the corresponding losses are also given in decibels). The variations of the variance
V of Alice’s field quadrature are due to different experimental adjustments. The information IBA is given in bits per time
slot. Also shown are the maximum information gained by Eve (IBE) and the extracted information by reverse reconciliation
(Irec). The ideal secret key bit rates would be obtained from our measured data with perfect key distillation that yields exactly
IBA − IBE bits (RR) or IAB − IAE bits (DR), whereas the practical secret key bit rates are the one achieved with our current
key distillation procedure (“–” means that no secret key is generated). Both bit rates are calculated over bursts of about 60,000
pulses at 800 kHz, not taking into account the duty cycle (∼ 5%) in the present set-up.
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FIG. 4: Values of IBA, IBE, and IAE as a function of the
line transmission G for V ≈ 40. Here, IBA is given by
equation (4a), including all transmission and detection noises
for evaluating VB and (VB|A)coh. The expression for IBE is
given by equation (4b), using the same VB and (VB|E)min =
N0/{G(χline + V
−1)}+Nel +Nhom. This expression realisti-
cally assumes that Eve cannot know the noises Nel and Nhom,
which are internal to Bob’s detection set-up. For comparison
with DR, the value of IAE is also plotted (the theoretical value
of IAE is obtained from ref. [13]).
tographic exchange. Table I shows the ideal and practical
net key rates of our reverse QKD protocol, as well as the
DR values for comparison. The RR scheme is efficient for
any value of G provided that the reconciliation protocol
achieves the limit given by IBA. However, unavoidable
deviations of the algorithm from Shannon’s limit reduce
the actual reconciled information Irec between Alice and
Bob, while IBE is of course assumed unaffected. For high
modulation (V ≈ 40) and low losses, the reconciliation
efficiency lies around 80%, which makes it possible to dis-
tribute a secret key at a rate of several hundreds of kilo-
bits per second. However, the achievable reconciliation
efficiency drops when the signal-to-noise ratio decreases,
but this can be improved by reducing the modulation
variance, which increases the ratio IBA/IBE . Although
the ideal secret key rate is then lower, we could pro-
cess the data with a reconciliation efficiency of 78% for
G = 0.49 (3.1 dB) and V = 27, resulting in a net key
rate of 75 kbits s−1 (see also Appendix A). This clearly
demonstrates that RR continuous-variable protocols op-
erate efficiently at and beyond the 3 dB loss limit of DR
protocols. We emphasize that this result is obtained de-
spite the fact that the evaluated reconciliation cost is
higher for RR than for DR: the better result for RR is
essentially due to its initial “quantum advantage”.
In photon-counting QKD, the key rate is limited by
the single-photon detectors, in which the avalanche pro-
cesses are difficult to control reliably at very high count-
ing rates. In contrast, homodyne detection may run at
frequencies up to tens of MHz. In addition, a specific
advantage of the high dimensionality of the QCV phase
space is that the field quadratures can be modulated with
a large dynamics, allowing the encoding of several key
bits per pulse (see Table I). Very high secret bit rates
are therefore attainable with our coherent-state protocol
on low-loss lines. For high-loss lines, our protocol is at
present limited by the reconciliation efficiency, but its in-
trinsic performances remain very high. Since most of the
limitations of the present proof-of-principle experiment
appear to be of a technical nature, there is still a con-
siderable margin for improvement, both in the hardware
(increased detection bandwidth, better homodyne effi-
ciency, lower electronic noise), and in the software (better
reconciliation algorithms [26] , see Appendix A). In con-
clusion, the way seems open for implementing the present
proposal at telecommunications wavelengths as a practi-
cal, high bit-rate, quantum key distribution scheme over
long distances.
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APPENDIX A: METHODS
Relevant Heisenberg relations
In a RR protocol, Alice’s estimator for xB and Eve’s
estimator for pB can be denoted respectively as αxA
and βpE , where α, β are real numbers. The corre-
sponding errors are xB|A,α = xB − αxA, and pB|E,β =
pB − βpE . Because Alice’s, Bob’s, and Eve’s oper-
ators commute, we have [xB|A,α, pB|E,β] = [xB, pB],
and thus the Heisenberg relation ∆x2B|A,α∆p
2
B|E,β ≥
N20 . Defining the conditional variances as V (xB |xA) =
minα{∆x
2
B|A,α} and V (pB|pE) = minβ{∆p
2
B|E,β}, we
obtain V (xB |xA)V (pB|pE) ≥ N
2
0
, or, by exchanging x
and p, V (pB|pA)V (xB |xE) ≥ N
2
0 .
Alice has the estimators (xA, pA) for the field
(xin, pin) = (xA + Ax, pA + Ap) that she sends, with
〈A2x〉 = 〈A
2
p〉 = sN0. Here s measures the amount of
squeezing possibly used by Alice in her state preparation
[14], with s ≥ V −1 for consistency with Heisenberg’s
relations. By calculating 〈p2A〉 = (V − s)N0, 〈p
2
B〉 =
Gp(V + χp)N0, 〈pApB〉 = G
1/2
p 〈p2A〉, we obtain the con-
ditional variance V (pB|pA) = 〈p
2
B〉 − |〈pApB〉|
2/〈p2A〉 =
Gp(s + χp)N0. This equation and the constraint s ≥
V −1 gives V (pB |pA) ≥ Gp(V
−1 + χp)N0, and similarly
V (xB |xA) ≥ Gx(V
−1 + χx)N0. The bound on VB|A is
thus obtained by assuming that Alice may use squeezed
or entangled beams, while the bound on VB|E can only be
achieved if Eve uses an entangling attack. This reflects
the fact that squeezing or entanglement play a crucial role
in our security demonstration, even though the proto-
col implies coherent states. Our security proof addresses
individual gaussian attacks only, but as the entangling
cloner attack saturates the Heisenberg uncertainty rela-
tions, we conjecture that it encompasses all incoherent
(non-collective) eavesdropping strategies.
Experimental set-up
A continuous-wave laser diode at 780 nm wavelength
associated with an acousto-optic modulator is used to
emit 120-ns (full-width at half-maximum) pulses at a
800 kHz rate. The signal pulses contain up to 250
photons, while the local oscillator (LO) power is 1.3 ×
108 photons per pulse. The amplitude of each pulse
is arbitrarily modulated by an integrated electro-optic
modulator. However, owing to the unavailability of a
fast phase modulator at 780 nm, the phase is not ran-
domly modulated but scanned continuously. No genuine
secret key can be distributed, strictly speaking, but ran-
dom permutations of Bob’s data are used to provide re-
alistic data (see Appendix B). The data are organized
in bursts of 60,000 pulses, separated by synchronization
periods also used to lock the phase of the LO. The overall
homodyne detection efficiency is 0.81, due to the optical
transmission (0.92), the mode-matching efficiency (0.96)
and the photodiode quantum efficiency (0.92). For the
critical data at 3 dB loss, the mode-matching efficiency
was improved to 0.99, and thus the overall efficiency was
0.84. We also point out that many blocks of data were
exchanged around the 3 dB loss point, with a typical rate
above 55 kbit s−1.
Secret key distillation
A common bit string is extracted from the continuous
data by sequentially reconciling several strings (“slices”)
of binary functions of the gaussian key elements, apply-
ing a binary reconciliation protocol successively on each
bit [8, 10]. Here, we used five slices, each being corrected
either by a trivial one-way protocol (communicating the
bits) when the bit error rate (BER) is high, or by the two-
way protocol Cascade [27, 28] when the BER is low. Note
that the disclosed slices are useful for reconciling the re-
maining slices with less information leaking to Eve, even
though they of course do not yield secret bits as such. In
addition, Alice and Bob encrypt their classical messages
using the one-time pad scheme with a fraction of the
previous key bits, or a bootstrap key for the first block.
For slices corrected with Cascade, the exchanged pari-
ties are encrypted with the same key bits on both sides
[29], making Eve aware of the differences between Alice’s
and Bob’s parities (that is, the error positions) but not
of their individual values. Fully communicated slices are
also encrypted, thereby revealing no information at all to
Eve. Still, Eve may exploit the interactivity of Cascade
and gain some information on the final key by combin-
ing her knowledge of the error positions with that of the
correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s gaussian values.
In the present protocol, this information is numerically
calculated for an entangling cloner attack, and then de-
stroyed by privacy amplification. This is achieved by
appropriate “hashing” [30] functions (see Appendix B).
The resulting net secret key rate is then obtained by sub-
tracting, from the raw key rate, the cost of the one-time
pad encryption and the error-position information. Fi-
nally, let us emphasize that sliced reconciliation can be
made very close to a one-way protocol by increasing the
number of key elements from which the bits are jointly
extracted (multidimensional reconciliation [8]). This ap-
proach was not implemented here, but should deliver an
improved secret key rate, approaching the value from the
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner formula [21, 22].
6APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION
Experimental set-up
The source consists of a CW laser diode (SDL 5412) at
780 nm associated with an acousto-optic modulator, used
to chop pulses with a duration 120 ns (full width at half-
maximum), at a repetition rate 800 kHz. To reduce the
excess noise, a grating-extended external cavity is used,
and the beam is spatially filtered using a single mode
fiber. Light pulses are then split onto a beam-splitter,
one beam being the local oscillator (LO), the other Alice’s
signal beam. The data is organised in bursts of 60,000
pulses, separated by time periods used to lock the phase
of the LO, and sequences of pulses to synchronize the
parties. In the present experiment, there is a burst every
1.6 seconds, corresponding to a duty cycle of about 5%,
which is obviously under-optimised but should be easy
to improve in further experiments.
The coherent state distribution is generated by modu-
lating both the amplitude and phase of the light pulses
with the appropriate probability law. In the present ex-
periment, the amplitude of each pulse is arbitrarily mod-
ulated at the nominal 800 kHz rate by an integrated
electro-optic LiNbO3 Mach-Zehnder interferometer. In
contrast, due to the unavailability of a fast phase modu-
lator at 780 nm, the phase is not randomly modulated but
scanned continuously from 0 to 2π using a piezoelectric
transducer (PZT). For such a deterministic phase varia-
tion, the security of the protocol is not warranted, and
thus no genuine secret key could be distributed strictly
speaking. However, the experiment provides realistic
data, having exactly the awaited structure provided that
random phase permutation on Bob’s data are performed.
Due to an imbalance between the paths of the inter-
ferometer which modulates the amplitude of the signal
beam, the extinction is not strictly zero. In the present
experiment that is only aimed at a proof of principle, we
subtract the offset field from the data received by Bob. In
a real cryptographic transmission, the offset field should
be compensated by Alice, either by adding a zeroing field,
or by using a better modulator.
All voltages for the electro-optic modulator or the PZT
are generated by an acquisition board (National Instru-
ments PCI6111E) connected to a computer. Although
all discussions assume the modulation to be continuous,
digitised voltages are used in practice. With our experi-
mental parameters, a resolution of 8 bits is enough to hide
the amplitude or phase steps under the shot noise. Since
the modulation voltage is produced using a 16 bits con-
verter, and the data is digitised over 12 bits, we may fairly
assume the modulation and measurement to be continu-
ous.
The homodyne detection was checked to be shot-noise
limited for LO power up to 5 × 108 photons/pulse. In
the present experiment, we used 1.3× 108 photons/pulse
for LO power, while each signal pulse contains up to 250
photons. Depending on the run, the overall detection
efficiency is either 0.81 or 0.84, due to optical transmis-
sion (0.92), mode-matching visibility (0.96 or 0.99) and
photodiode quantum efficiency (0.92).
The experiment is thus carried out in such a way that
all useful parameters can be measured experimentally.
Reconciliation and privacy amplification protocols can
thus be performed in realistic – though not fully secret
– conditions. The limitations of the present set-up are
essentially due to the lack of appropriate fast amplitude
and phase modulators at 780 nm. This should be eas-
ily solved by operating at telecom wavelengths (1540-
1580 nm) where such equipment is readily available. Let
us point out also that it is not convenient to transmit sep-
arately the signal and LO, so a better solution would be
to use a frequency sideband technique similar to Me´rolla
et al. [31]. Then all light pulses are transmitted together
along the same fibre, and a separate radio-frequency is
sent from Alice to Bob in order to reconstruct the optical
phase information.
Hypothesis about the detector’s noise : “realistic”
vs “paranoid” assumptions
After the quantum exchange, Alice and Bob reveal a
subset of their values taken randomly to evaluate the
transmission G and the total added noise variance. This
variance has four contributions: the shot noise N0, the
channel noise χlineN0, the electronics noise of Bob’s de-
tector (Nel = 0.33N0), and the noise due to imperfect
homodyne detection efficiency (Nhom = 0.27N0). The
two detection noises Nel and Nhom originate from Bob’s
detection system, so one may reasonably assume that
they do not contribute to Eve’s knowledge. This “re-
alistic” assumption has been followed in the article. In
that case, the noise from Bob’s detection system also
affects Eve’s information so, in equation (4b), we take
(VB|E)min = N0/{Gline(χline+V
−1)}+Nel+Nhom, where
Gline stands for the line transmission.
In contrast, in a “paranoid” approach, one should as-
sume that the noises Nel and Nhom are also controlled by
Eve, that gives her a supplementary advantage. In that
case, (VB|E)min will be given by N0/{G(χ+V
−1)}, where
G now includes both the line and detection efficiencies
and χ includes both the line and detection noises. In all
cases, the value of IBA is given by equation (4a), where χ
is the total equivalent noise including both transmission
and detection.
Presently we are able to extract practically a key with
up to 3.1 dB losses under the “realistic” approach with
a reverse reconciliation protocol. Considering now the
“paranoid” assumption and reverse reconciliation, the
ideal secret key rate is 420 kbits s−1 for a lossless line,
and 200 kbits s−1 for Gline = 0.79 (1.0 dB). However, se-
cret bits could be delivered only in the lossless case, at a
practical rate of 195 kbits s−1. It is clear that an increase
in the reconciliation efficiency would immediately trans-
7late into a larger achievable range. Let us point out that
we always assume in both the “realistic” or the “para-
noid” approach that Eve has an ideal software, quantum
memories, perfectly entangled beams, etc. If any of these
hypotheses is relaxed, the practical secure range may be
extended over the “threshold” presently set by the lim-
ited reconciliation efficiency. However, it is not the pur-
pose of the present paper to discuss such “constrained
attacks”.
Implementation of secret key distillation
Secret key distillation was performed by a computer
program written in standard C++ that implements the
steps described in the paper. Although Alice’s and Bob’s
data are both processed on the same computer, it is done
in the same way as if the parties were distant and were
using a network connection as classical channel. The par-
ticular platform used is a regular PC running Linux.
As bursts of data are input to the program, a part of
the gaussian key elements are sacrificed and used to es-
timate the characteristics of the quantum channel. This
includes the variances and the correlation coefficient be-
tween both sides, which would be exchanged between Al-
ice and Bob over the public authenticated classical chan-
nel in a real-life setup.
Depending on the value of the estimated IAB, the
two parties agree on appropriate binary functions (slices
[8, 10]) that will transform their gaussian values into bits.
These bits are then reconciled, as described in the paper,
with sliced error correction [8, 10] and an implementa-
tion [28] of Cascade [27] as a sub-routine. In our imple-
mentation, 5 binary functions are used per gaussian key
elements, out of which 2 or 3 (depending on IAB) are
fully disclosed, while the remaining 3 or 2 are reconciled
using Cascade.
Next, the data are moved to the privacy amplification
routine. Excluding the bits that are fully disclosed and
from which no secret key can be extracted, the reconciled
bits are processed by use of a transformation randomly
taken in a universal class of hash functions [30, 32], which
in our case is the class of truncated linear functions in a
finite field. First, we consider the reconciled bits as co-
efficients of a binary polynomial in a representation of
the Galois field GF(2110503), hereby called the reconciled
polynomial. Then Alice and Bob publicly and randomly
choose a random element of the same field and multi-
ply the reconciled polynomial with this chosen element.
Finally, they extract from the resulting polynomial the
desired number of least significant bits. In our imple-
mentation, the representation of the field is GF(2)[x]/(p),
where p = x110503 +x519 +1 is an irreducible polynomial
over GF(2), see ref. [33]. The fact that this operation
can be implemented efficiently [34] motivated our choice.
The size of the field allows us to process up to 110503
bits at once, or equivalently blocks of about 55200 gaus-
sian key elements when Cascade operates on 2 bits per
gaussian key element or of 36800 elements with 3 bits
per element. To produce a longer key, the gaussian key
elements must thus be grouped into blocks.
As explained in the paper, the number of bits that
are destroyed by privacy amplification depends on the
amount of information that could be inferred by a poten-
tial eavesdropper. An easvesdropper Eve has two sources
of knowledge. First, she may have attacked the quantum
channel and second, she knows the error positions of the
reconciled bits from listening to the execution of Cas-
cade. Let K be the final key, E the ancilla Eve uses
for quantum eavesdropping, and ∆ the error positions
revealed during reconciliation. We thus need to evalu-
ate I(K;E,∆) = I(K;E) + I(K; ∆|E). The first term
on the rhs is upper bounded by IBE (in RR) or IAE (in
DR), while the second term is evaluated numerically for
an entangling cloner attack.
This numerical evaluation of I(K; ∆|E) comes down
to integrating I(K; ∆|E = e) for all possible outcomes e
of E, weighted by the probability density function p(e) of
E. In the case of the entangling cloner attack, E refers
both to the knowledge of Eve’s half of the EPR state
she injects and to her eavesdropping of the state being
sent to Bob, so E denotes a bivariate gaussian variable
whose covariance matrix can be calculated from the chan-
nel characteristics (i.e., attenuation and added noise am-
plitude). For a given outcome e of E, Eve can infer A and
B, Alice’s and Bob’s key elements as a bivariate gaussian
variable. Since K and ∆ are discrete functions of only
A and B, the probability distribution of K(A,B) and
∆(A,B) conditionally on E = e can be calculated, hence
giving I(K; ∆|E = e).
Finally, a part of the generated key is used to encrypt
[29] the execution of the reconciliation for the next block.
The remaining bits, namely the net secret key, can be
then used for instance to encrypt the classical communi-
cations between Alice and Bob using a one-time pad.
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